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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-STATE AcnoN-TRADB UNioN's AurnoRITY Is
NoT DERIVED FRoM THE STATE-Plaintiffs claimed that defendant union and
defendant company conspired to discriminate against Negro cab driver employees
by means of a working regulation intended to compel plaintiffs to pick up
passengers only in wards inhabited primarily by Negroes. 1 Two bases for
original jurisdiction in federal court were advanced. First, it was contended
that the cause of action involved more than $3,000 and arose under the laws
of the United States2 because the bargaining power of the union was conferred
upon it by the National Labor Relations Act.3 Second, it was maintained that
the Civil Rights Act4 vested jurisdiction, on the ground that the discrimination
was practiced under color of state law since the union acted by authority
conferred upon it by the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act.5 Held, original
jurisdiction was not vested in the district court. The right of the union to
engage in collective bargaining was recognized long prior to the NLRA and
hence its power was not derived from the act. Also, since the power of the
union was conferred upon it by the consent of its members, it could not be
said that it acted under authority bestowed upon it by either the federal or
Pennsylvania acts. Williams v. Yellow Cab Co., (3d Cir. 1952) 200 F. (2d)
302.
Despite substantial evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended
to reach invasions of civil rights by individuals as well as states,6 the principal
case offers further proof of the tenacity with which the courts have adhered to
the requirement of some state action, as laid down by the majority in the Civil
Rights Cases.7 However, the deterrent effect of this requirement has been
mitigated by the Supreme Court's recognition that there is no sharp line between individual and state action, and thus the desire to protect civil rights
has resulted in a continuous expansion of the concept of state action.8 This
expansion has proceeded along three somewhat overlapping lines. The first
development has been a willingness to accept a less obvious showing of official
action as satisfying the requirement of state action. This is typified by the
Screws case,9 which held that there may be state action even though an official
is not acting within the scope of his prescribed authority. The second expansion
has been the equating of state sanctions with state action. Thus the Court
1 Even were jurisdiction to have been granted, it is quite unlikely that any actionable
discrimination was involved. See Williams v. Yellow Cab Co., (D.C. Pa. 1952) 103 F.
Supp. 847, esp. at 852 et seq.
2 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §1331.
8 61 Stat. L. 143; amending §9(a) (1947), 29 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §l59(a).
4 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §1343(3).
5 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1952) §21 I.I et seq.
6 FLAcx, .ADOPTION oF THB FoURT.l!ENTH .fu.mNDMBNT (1908).
7109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18 (1883).
s Barnett, ''What is State Action?" 24 ORE. L. REv. 227 (1945); Gressman, "Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation," 50 Mrca. L. REv. 1323 (1952).
9 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031 (1945). This put to rest
uncertainty which had been created by Barney v. New York, 193 U.S. 430, 24 S.Ct. 502
(1904).
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found that it would be state action if a state court was to enforce a private
contract containing restrictive covenants.10 The third avenue for enlargement
of the state action concept has been where a private organization is exercising
a state function. Thus in the All-wright case11 the Court found state action
was involved when a private organization was able to prevent Negroes from
voting in a primary election. A fourth possibility for future expansion of the
scope of state action is suggested by Marsh v. Alabama.12 There a state court
was prevented from enforcing a statute which enabled the owners of a company
town to have an individual arrested when she refused to desist from distributing
religious literature on the streets of the town. Language in the opinion suggests
the possibility that when a private organization becomes imbued with a public
function it may then be subject to the same constitutional limitations as a state.18
In the principal case, the court concluded that the union was not within
the rule of the All-wright case since it was not exercising "a basic state function."14 However, there are grounds for doubting whether ''basic state function"
should have been so used to limit the concept of state action. Since the right
to work has been judicially recognized as a natural right,15 it seems reasonable
to conclude that organizations legally capable16 of substantially affecting that
right might well be held to have satisfied the test promulgated in the Marsh
case, i.e., they are imbued with public functions and hence come within the
concept of state action. In a recent case a privately endowed library operated
by a privately elected board of trustees was held to the standards of state action
because it received substantial financial aid from the city.17 Such a decision
adds credence to the suggestion that state action need not be political.18 Further
doubts concerning the requirements of a basic function as apparently construed
10 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948). Such contracts had been
held valid in Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 46 S.Ct. 521 (1926).
11 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S.Ct. 757 (1944), overruling Grovey v.
Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 55 S.Ct. 622 (1935).
12 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276 (1946).
l:3 It is not clear whether the basis of the Court's opinion was that judicial enforcement
of a private right is state action, or whether the private conduct here was to be treated as
state action for the purpose at hand. The former is suggested by language in Shelley v.
Kraemer, note 10 supra, at 22, and also by Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 at 643, 71
S.Ct. 920 (1951); the latter by Frankfurter, J., concurring in Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U.S. 268 at 277, 71 S.Ct. 325 (1951). See also 44 MxcH. L. REv. 848 (1946).
14 Principal case at 307.
15 See, e.g., concurring opinion in Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S.
746 at 762, 4 S.Ct. 652 (1884).
16 See, e.g., Witmer, "Civil I:.iberties And The Trade Union," 50 YALE L.J. 621
(1941); Murray, ''The Right To Equal Opportunity in Employment," 33 CALIF. L. REv.
388 (1945).
17Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Library, (4th Cir. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 212, cert. den. 326 U.S.
721, 66 S.Ct. 26 (1945).
18 In regard to this contention it is difficult to appraise the signi£cance of the denial
of certiorari in Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E. (2d) 541 (1949),
cert. den. 339 U.S. 981, 70 S.Ct. 1019 (1950), Black and Douglas, JJ., disagreeing. In
this case the New York Court of Appeals found, in a four to three decision, that no state
action was involved although powers of eminent domain and certain tax exemptions were
granted to defendant, a private company. See 15 Umv. Cm. L. R.Ev. 745 (1948).
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by the court in the principal case are suggested by decisions where the actions
of a political subdivision are held to be state action.19 Clearly, many of the
actions of a municipality or administrative agency20 would not be basic to the
continued political existence of the state. These considerations suggest that a
union may well meet the requirements of exercising a basic state function
even if its activities ·are not essentially political. Actually, in the principal
case the chief ground for the court's conclusion that no state action was involved
was that the union acted pursuant to the consent of its members and not by
virtue of power derived from the state statute. This distinction is based upon
dictum in the Steele case, 21 where the Supreme Court indicated that a union
deriving its authority wholly from a federal statute would be subject to the
constitutional limitations on federal action so far as civil rights are concerned.
But in the principal case, since the plaintiffs were union members and the union
contract with the employer predated the state statute permitting exclusive
bargaining agents, the union authority was derived from the consent of the
employees. Although such a conclusion appears warranted under the existing
federal decisions, one may wonder whether it is warranted in light of the
situation which actually obtains. Since the union rules and the contract between the union and the employer required union membership as a condition
of employment,22 and since the plaintiffs had no part in selecting the particular
union with which the employer contracted, may it not be as unrealistic to say
the union's authority was derived from consent as to say that there is freedom
of contract between a hotel and a prospective female employee?23

S. I. Shuman, S.Ed.

19 E.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666 (1938).
20 As to finding state action in administrative agencies, see Home Telephone and
Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 33 S.Ct. 312 (1913); Hale, "Unconstitutional Acts As Federal Crimes," 60 HARv. L. REv. 65 at 80 et seq. (1946).
21 Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 at 199, 65 S.Ct. 226 (1944).
22Williams v. Yellow Cab Co., note 1 supra, at 850.
23 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. 578 (1937), overruling
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 43 S.Ct. 394 (1923).

